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INTRODUCTION
Autism is a brain development disorder characterized by impair-
ments in social and communication abilities.1  Children with autism
or one of the related autistic spectrum disorders (“ASD”) are eligi-
ble for special education under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), which provides, in part, that disabled
students must be educated with non-disabled peers as often as pos-
sible, a practice referred to as mainstreaming or inclusion.  The fed-
eral circuit courts apply different tests to evaluate compliance with
this mainstreaming requirement, but as argued in this Note, the
circuit tests are effectively equivalent with respect to children diag-
nosed with ASDs.  One significant issue in applying each of these
tests is that tensions exist between the mainstreaming requirement
of the IDEA and the clinical features of children with ASD diagno-
sis.  As discussed below, children with ASD have deficits in com-
municative and social behaviors that tend to minimize the
importance of mainstreaming for these children.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background on autism and
methods of diagnosis and treatment.  Part II of this Note reviews
the development of the IDEA and outlines the main judicial tests
for determining compliance with the mainstreaming requirement.
Part III of this Note argues that despite differences in phrasing, the
1. Comm. on Children with Disabilities, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The Pediatri-
cian’s Role in the Diagnosis and Management of Autistic Spectrum Disorder in Chil-
dren, 107 PEDIATRICS 1221, 1221 (2001) [hereinafter Diagnosis and Management].
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circuit tests as applied in the context of autistic children involve
substantially the same inquiries.  Part III discusses the tensions that
exist between the needs of children with autism and the main-
streaming requirement of the IDEA, concluding that Congress and
the Department of Education should relax the mainstreaming re-
quirement in the context of autistic spectrum disorders.
I. AUTISM, METHODS OF DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT
A. Background on Autistic Spectrum Disorders
Autism is a term used to describe a set of cognitive, social and
behavioral impairments that are commonly found to coexist in af-
fected individuals.2  The disorder was first reported by Leo Kanner
in a seminal publication in 1943,3 in which Kanner reported obser-
vations of eleven children who exhibited a set of undocumented
behavioral atypicalities.  These include a lack of social awareness
or indifference to social activities or contact and repetitive, stereo-
typed or ritualistic behaviors such as rocking, spinning, or draw-
ing.4  Affected individuals usually show limited development in
language skills paired with enhancement in some cognitive areas,
such as strikingly superior memory for specific sets of facts on a
single topic.5  Kanner highlighted the childrens’ apparent indiffer-
ence to the external world using the phrase “extreme autistic
aloneness”6 that “whenever possible, disregards, ignores, shuts out
anything that comes to the child from the outside.”7
The contemporary understanding of the symptoms of autism is
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders — Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), the handbook for diagnos-
ing mental illness that is published by the American Psychiatric
Association.8  DSM-IV-TR categorizes autism as one of several
2. Id.
3. Leo Kanner, Autistic Disorders of Affective Contact, 2 NERVOUS CHILD 217
(1943).
4. Christine M. Freitag, The Genetics of Autistic Disorders and its Clinical Rele-
vance: A Review of the Literature, 12 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 2, 2 (2007) (citation
omitted).
5. See Kanner, supra note 3, at 217-41.
6. Kanner likely used the term “autistic” because it derives from the Greek “au-
tos” (self), reflecting the disregard for most experiences or events outside of the self.
Prior to Kanner’s use of the term, Eugen Bleuler included the term “autism” in early
diagnoses of schizophrenia as a means of referring to the impaired social interest ob-
served in schizophrenic patients.  Freitag, supra note 4, at 2.
7. Kanner, supra note 3, at 242.
8. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS—TEXT REVISION, (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
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“Pervasive Developmental Disorders” (“PDDs”) including autism,
Asperger’s syndrome, and “Pervasive Developmental Disorder-
Not Otherwise Specified (“PDD-nos”).”9  Asperger’s syndrome
and PDD-nos are considered less debilitating disorders than au-
tism.10  These three disorders are commonly referred to as “autistic
spectrum disorders” (“ASDs”) in reference to the continuum of
behavioral symptoms that attend these diagnoses.  The specific dis-
tinctions between these disorders is well beyond the scope of this
Note, but these related disorders are mentioned to emphasize the
complexity of making the diagnosis of autism.  Autism itself is the
most common of these PDDs, and recent data from the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention indicates that ASDs affect as
many as one in every 150 children in the United States.11  Autism
also creates substantial emotional12 and monetary13 costs for edu-
cators and the taxpayers who fund school districts. At present, the
9. Additional pervasive developmental disorders include Rett’s syndrome and
“Child Integrative Disorder.” See id. at 69.
10. Id. at 74, 80-84.  According to the DSM-IV-TR, unlike autism, Asperger’s syn-
drome does not usually involve developmental delay in language or cognitive skills,
and social interaction is more frequent in individuals with Asperger’s syndrome than
in autism.  Further, in autism, extreme interests are often ritualistic, repetitive motor
behaviors that are often associated with distress  whereas in Asperger’s syndrome, an
affected individual “can amass a great deal of facts and information.” Id. at 80.
11. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CDC Releases
New Data on Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) from Multiple Communities in the
United States, (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2007/
r070208.htm.  In 1998, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began a com-
prehensive study of the prevalence of ASDs in children.  This program was extended
in scope as a part of the Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, §1 et seq.
114 Stat. 1101 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 41 U.S.C.), and has tracked
autism prevalence in 2000 and 2002.  Pursuant to a Congressional mandate encom-
passed by sections 102-05 of the Children’s Health Act of 2000, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services publishes annual reports to Congress on the implementa-
tion of this plan.
12. See Nightline: Autism and Applied Behavioral Analysis:  To Find The Words
(ABC News television broadcast July 17, 2001) (noting that parental costs are not just
monetary — specialized, private education for children reported to cost over $30,000
per year—but also emotional). Id.
13. See Tom T. Shimabukuro et al., Medical Expenditures for Children with an
Autism Spectrum Disorder in a Privately Insured Population, 38 J. AUTISM DEV. DIS-
ORDERS 546, 548 (2007), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/
xm6k9420321w19l6/fulltext.pdf (noting that insurance costs for school-age children di-
agnosed with autistic spectrum disorder can be nearly 6.2 times as high as insurance
costs for non-ASD children of the same age group); see also Michael L. Ganz, The
Lifetime Distribution of the Incremental Societal Costs of Autism, 161 ARCHIVES PEDI-
ATRICS ADOLESCENT MED. 343, 345 (2007) (calculating total per capita lifetime costs
of autism among three to seven year olds as $446,203 in 2003 dollars).
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etiology of autism is unknown, although research continues in the
search for causes of the disease.
B. Diagnosing Autistic Spectrum Disorders in Children
The DSM-IV-TR describes behavioral features associated with
autism, including social deficits, such as impairment in nonverbal
communication behaviors (for example, eye-to-eye gaze, facial ex-
pression, body postures, and gestures) to regulate social interac-
tion, lack of social or emotional reciprocity, significant
impairments in the development of spoken language, stereotyped
and repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, and activities, and
persistent preoccupation with parts of objects.14
Clinicians, including psychologists, pediatricians15 and psychia-
trists, parents and educators16 play a role in diagnosing autism, and
several methods exist to make this diagnosis.  The first stage entails
monitoring children for signs of the disorder.17  Parents and physi-
cians can observe whether specific behaviors or other indicia of
ASD are present in the child.  At the next stage, diagnostic screen-
ing is performed using questionnaires administered to parents.  A
common diagnostic tool is the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Re-
vised.18  Diagnosis is complicated by the fact that, as a spectrum
disorder, the degree of impairment will differ substantially between
children given the “same” diagnosis of ASD.  One possible reason
for such heterogeneity in outcomes for individuals diagnosed with
autism is that it is not a single disease, but rather a syndrome com-
prising several underlying biological impairments.19  In the context
of education, a child with an ASD diagnosis is eligible for special
14. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 8, at 75.
15. See Diagnosis and Management, supra note 1.
16. See Daniel H. Ingram et al., Assessing Children with Autism, Mental Retarda-
tion, and Typical Development Using the Playground Observation Checklist, 11 AU-
TISM 311 (2007).
17. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 8, at 73 (noting that the onset of autistic disorder
is prior to the age of three, and that parents typically note concerns about their child’s
“lack of interest in social interaction”).
18. See Catherine Lord et al., Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised:  A Revised
Version of a Diagnostic Interview for Caregivers of Individuals with Possible Pervasive
Developmental Disorders, 24 J. AUTISM DEV. DISORDERS 659 (1994).  The Austism
Diagnostic Interview-Revised (“ADI-R”) is a ninety-three item clinical review that
evaluates behaviors and traits frequently associated with a diagnosis of autism, such as
repetitive gesturing and social withdrawal.
19. See Irving I. Gottesman & Todd D. Gould, The Endophenotype Concept in
Psychiatry: Etymology and Strategic Intentions, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 636, 637
(2003) (noting that such collective biological impairments are referred to as
“endophenotypes”).
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education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”).20
C. Treatments for Children with Autism
1. Applied Behavioral Analysis
One widely-used intervention for children with autism is applied
behavioral analysis (“ABA”).  ABA relies on repeated, one-on-
one training involving a therapist and the child.21  The child is given
a stimulus, such as a request to make eye contact with the therapist
or point at some named feature of an object, such as the eye or
nose of a doll.  If the child produces the requested response to the
stimulus, the therapist provides a reward to the child, such as a
food the child enjoys, or an object the child appears to view as a
treat, such as stickers.  Although instances of ABA leading to dra-
matic improvements are reported,22 children more commonly ex-
perience moderate gains.23
The technique is very time-intensive, typically involving forty
hours per week of therapy, and progress is generally measured
over multiple years.24  Children often enter ABA therapy at an
early age, in many instances younger than three years old, and con-
tinue for several years thereafter.  The duration of the therapy is
accompanied by significant costs.25  Specialized training is required
to perform the therapy, which limits the availability of qualified
20. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2004) (including autism as one of many enu-
merated disabilities that are eligible for special education under the IDEA).
21. The technique was developed at the University of California and described in
a 1987 paper that found forty-seven percent of the participating autistic children
achieved “normal” scores on commonly used behavioral measures. See O. Ivar
Lovaas, Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational and Intellectual Functioning in
Young Autistic Children, 55 J. CONSULTING &  CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1987).
22. See Glen O. Sallows & Tamlynn D. Graupner, Intensive Behavioral Treatment
for Children with Autism:  Four-Year Outcome and Predictors, 110 AM. J. MENTAL
RETARDATION 417, 433 (2005) (finding that with intensive behavioral treatments,
forty-eight percent of the participating autistic children achieved normal range IQ and
language skills).
23. See Saasha Sutera et al., Predictors of Optimal Outcome in Toddlers Diagnosed
with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 37 J. AUTISM DEV. DISORDERS 98, 99 (2007) (noting
that ABA is associated with optimal outcomes, but that the individual child’s charac-
teristics are more likely to be outcome determinative); see also Nightline, supra note
12.
24. See, e.g., Lovaas, supra note 21 (conducting study of efficacy of behavioral
interventions in autistic children for over six years).
25. See Shimabukuro, supra note 13; see also Micheletti v. State Health Benefits R
Comm’n, 913 A.2d 842 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), aff’d, 934 A.2d 633 (N.J.
2007). Micheletti is an example of how difficult it can be for the parent of an autistic
child to obtain insurance reimbursement for behavioral therapy.
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personnel.  ABA can also be a topic of dispute between parents
and school districts in the creation of a child’s “individualized edu-
cation plan”.26  The nature of ABA demands that the child be iso-
lated from his or her peers for substantial amounts of time.27  As
discussed below in Part III, this means that such treatments may be
at odds with the Congressional preference for “mainstreaming” in-
dicated in §1412(a)(5)(A) of the IDEA.28
2. Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related
Communication Handicapped Children (“TEACCH”) Therapy
TEACCH uses behavior modification techniques in a manner
similar to ABA and also uses one-on-one interaction, usually in a
“self-contained” classroom in isolation from other peers, and with
contributions from parents as “co-therapists.”29  TEACCH is
aimed at the use of communication methods specifically tailored to
a particular child, using not only words but also pictures or other
visual aids that can communicate.  The therapy is intended to pro-
vide a more flexible method of intervention than ABA, but the two
techniques do share many similarities.
3. Picture Exchange Communication System (“PECS”) teaching
PECS30 uses drawings or images on cards to allow the child to
express concepts with visual representations, rather than requiring
the child to make verbal responses.31  The goal is to assist children
with autism to communicate in a manner that can circumvent their
impairments in language development.32  PECS uses a gradual ap-
26. See, e.g., Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1034 (8th Cir. 2000)
(involving parents who argue that the school district failed to provide appropriate
education because it did not provide ABA therapy); see also Malkentzos v. DeBuono,
102 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving a parent seeking compensation from school
district for home-based ABA therapy).
27. See Gill, 217 F.3d at 1033 (noting that school district was concerned that thirty-
five to forty hours per week of home-based ABA therapy would not allow child with
autism sufficient interaction with his peers).
28. See infra Part III.B.
29. See Sally Ozonoff & Kristina Cathcart, Effectiveness of a Home Program Inter-
vention for Young Children with Autism, 28 J. AUTISM DEV. DISORDERS 25, 26 (1998)
(noting that TEACCH is a departure from other programs in its focus on the integral
role of parents in treatment of autism).
30. Andrew S. Bondy & Lori A. Frost, The Picture Exchange Communication Sys-
tem, 9 FOCUS ON AUTISTIC BEHAV. 1 (1994).
31. Id. ¶ 7; see also Deborah Carr & Janet Felce, The Effects of PECS Teaching to
Phase III on the Communicative Interactions Between Children with Autism and Their
Teachers, 37 J. AUTISM DEV. DISORDERS 724, 725 (2007).
32. Bondy & Frost, supra note 30, ¶ 7.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ506.txt unknown Seq: 8 29-OCT-08 12:39
1232 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
proach to build up a repertoire of communicative skills from sim-
ple identification of things to expression of needs or wants to
“conversation-like” experience.33
II. THE IDEA, “MAINSTREAMING,” AND JUDICIAL TESTS OF
COMPLIANCE WITH THE “MAINSTREAMING” REQUIREMENT
A. A Brief History of the Development of the IDEA
The history of American special education recounts a progres-
sion from isolation and ostracism of disabled students toward a rec-
ognition that providing disabled students with a meaningful
education is a critical policy goal.  As recently as 1965, federal in-
volvement with education of disabled children focused largely on
providing funding for states without substantive guidelines as to
how those funds should be used.34 To counter this tendency, Con-
gress enacted title VI of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (“ESEA”),35 establishing the Bureau of Education for the
Handicapped36 to administer effective education of the disabled, as
well as establishing educational grants to fund such efforts.37  Sub-
sequently, in 1970, Congress repealed the ESEA and enacted the
Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”)38 that contained simi-
lar special education grant provisions found in the ESEA.39  The
availability of funding through these Federal programs did not,
however, lead to effective education of disabled children.  Two
seminal cases, Mills v. Board of Education40 and Pennsylvania As-
sociation for Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania,41 (“PARC”) illus-
trated that disabled students were still denied access to free public
education.  In Mills, the District Court of the District of Columbia
noted the exclusion of poor, disabled students from the public edu-
cation system without meaningful recourse.42  In ordering the Dis-
trict of Columbia to comply with its plan to provide public
33. See generally id.
34. See S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 5 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1429.
35. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161,
80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966).
36. See id. at 1208.
37. See id. at 1204.
38. See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601, 84 Stat. 171,
175 (1970).
39. See id. at 178.
40. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
41. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
42. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 869-70.
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education for disabled students, the court in Mills noted that the
access to a public education had been described by the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Education43 as “the very foundation of
good citizenship.”44 It further noted that blocking access to public
education cut directly into constitutional guarantees of Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection.45 Mills suggests a preference that dis-
abled students be placed in regular public school environments
when possible:
[N]o child eligible for a publicly supported education in the Dis-
trict of Columbia public schools shall be excluded from a regular
public school assignment by a Rule, policy, or practice of the
Board of Education of the District of Columbia or its agents
unless such child is provided (a) adequate alternative educa-
tional services suited to the child’s needs . . . .46
In PARC, the district court also ordered a state educational
agency school district to provide education to mentally retarded
citizens.47  In its order, the court noted the “obligation to place
each mentally disabled child in a free, public program of education
and training appropriate to the child’s capacity . . . .”48  Similar to
the court in Mills, the court in PARC expressly acknowledged the
need for placement of disabled students in regular classrooms, stat-
ing that “placement in a regular public school class is preferable to
placement in a special public school class and placement in a spe-
cial public school class is preferable to placement in any other type
of program of education and training.”49
Congress noted these landmark cases during its debates on the
renewal of the EHA in 1975.50  Congress indicated that Mills and
PARC were but a sample of numerous cases that “guarantee the
right to free publicly-supported education for handicapped chil-
dren . . . .”51  These cases highlighted a clear need for federal in-
volvement in the area of special education.52  Congress also
recognized a significant failure to provide educational services to
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
45. See id. at 875.
46. Id. at 878.
47. PARC, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
48. Id. at 1260.
49. Id.
50. See S. Rep. 94-168 at 6, as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 6-8 (noting  the significant agreement amongst educators, parents,
legislators, and other interested parties that a greater federal role was needed in the
area of special education).
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disabled children, noting at the time that of the 8 million eligible
disabled children, “only 3.9 million such children are receiving an
appropriate education.  1.75 million handicapped children are re-
ceiving no educational services at all, and 2.5 million handicapped
children are receiving an inappropriate education.”53  To address
this issue, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (“EAHCA”) in 1975.54  This legislation created a
mechanism for federal assistance in funding special education pro-
grams that conditioned receipt of federal funds on compliance with
the terms of the EAHCA, specifically that disabled children were
to receive a “free appropriate public education” and that parents
would have meaningful opportunities to influence their child’s edu-
cational path.55  The EAHCA was amended in 1990 and renamed
the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”).56
The IDEA, like its predecessors, requires that states submit com-
prehensive plans to the federal government describing the mecha-
nisms by which that state will educate disabled children.57  The
Department of Education provides regulatory regimes that supply
context to many statutory provisions of the IDEA.  For example
while the IDEA also provides explicit categories of disabilities that
are covered in §1401(a), the Department of Education created reg-
ulations incorporating Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(“ADHD”) into the generic “other health impairment” category.58
Eligible students must fit into one of these disability categories,
and the disability must adversely impact the child’s ability to re-
53. Id. at 8.
54. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975) (codifed as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1406, 1411-1420 (1975)).
55. Id. at sec. 3(c), § 601.
56. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat.
1103 (1990).  The IDEA was subsequently amended in 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, 105
Stat. 587 (1991), and again in 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997). The most
recent amendments to the IDEA were made in 2004, pursuant to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA), Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat.
2647 (2004) to bring the IDEA in line with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6304, 6311
(2006)).
57. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(C) (2004).
58. See id. § 1401(3)(A) (defining the disabilities covered as autism, deaf-blind-
ness, deafness, hearing impairment, mental retardation, multiple disabilities, orthope-
dic impairments, other health impairment, emotional disturbance, specific learning
disability speech or language impairment, traumatic brain injury, and visual impair-
ment including blindness).  ADHD falls within the “other health impairment” cate-
gory, as clarified by title 34, section 300.8(c)(9) of the Code of Federal Regulations,
although the child must experience adverse effects on his or her educational perform-
ance to fall within the statutory definition according to section 300.8(c)(9)(ii).
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FIGURE 1.  TIMELINE ILLUSTRATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CURRENT IDEA, BEGINNING WITH THE ENACTMENT OF THE
ESEA IN 1966.
ceive an educational benefit.59  The school districts must work with
parents to develop and annually evaluate an individualized educa-
tion program (“IEP”) that is tailored to meet the needs of that
child.60  The principle features of the IDEA are the requirement
that the IEP must provide a “free, appropriate public education”61
in the “least restrictive environment.”62  The Supreme Court ad-
59. See 34 CFR § 300.8(c)(9)(ii) (2007).
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2004).
61. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (providing that a state is obligated to provide a “free ap-
propriate public education [that] is available to all children with disabilities residing in
the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive, including children with disabilities
who have been suspended or expelled from school.”) (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).  It is important to note that the cases cited prior to 1998
discuss the IDEA statute governing the least restrictive environment as
“§ 1412(5)(b).”  The IDEA amendments of 1997 made changes to the statutory text
that rearranged section 1412, resulting in a numbering change from section 1412(5)(b)
to section 1412(a)(5)(A).  In each of the circuit cases discussed in Part II, the courts
were working with section 1412(5)(b), the predecessor to section 1412(a)(5)(A).
There are no clear substantive differences in the language of the previous and current
versions of section 1412, and the courts do not appear to draw a substantive distinc-
tion between the two.
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dressed the specific definition of a “free appropriate public educa-
tion” in Board of Education v. Rowley.63
Rowley concerned the IEP of a deaf child, Amy Rowley, whose
IEP provided that her school would provide assistive technology
such as a wireless hearing aid that amplified her teacher’s and
classmates’ voices for Amy.64  Amy’s parents wanted a qualified
sign-language interpreter present instead of the assistive technolo-
gies she had previously used.65  The school rejected this request af-
ter finding that Amy was achieving academically without the
presence of an interpreter.66  After this rejection was affirmed by
the state educational commissioner, Amy’s parents brought a suit
in federal district court, claiming that the failure to provide an in-
terpreter denied Amy a free, appropriate public education.67  The
Rowleys prevailed at trial, where the judge found that Amy was a
bright girl whose academic progress was hampered by her deaf-
ness.68  Therefore, the judge held that the failure to provide an in-
terpreter denied Amy a free, appropriate public education because
she was not being given the same opportunity as her peers to maxi-
mize her educational potential.69  On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed the trial court decisions of fact as not “clearly erroneous”
and agreed with the court’s conclusions of law.70  In dissent, Judge
Mansfield argued that there was no indication that Congress in-
tended the IDEA and its predecessors to provide “an opportunity
to achieve [the disabled student’s] full potential commensurate
with the opportunity provided to other children.”71  Instead, Mans-
field argued, Congress simply intended to assist disabled students
to reach self-sufficiency,72 and that a standard such as the one ap-
plied by the district court required some measure of a child’s full
potential, which Mansfield criticized as “an impossible burden.”73
Instead, Mansfield argued that the IDEA really required that the
IEP be created so as to decrease the child’s dependency on others,
63. 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982).
64. See id. at 184.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 184-85.
67. See id.
68. See Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (1980).
69. See id. at 534.  The trial court judge held that a free, appropriate public educa-
tion meant “that each handicapped child be given an opportunity to achieve his full
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.” Id.
70. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 947-48 (2d Cir. 1980).
71. Id. at 952 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 953.
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and to potentially allow the child to reach the same degree of per-
formance as the child’s peers.74  When it heard the case, the Su-
preme Court generally agreed with Mansfield.  The Court
examined the text of the IDEA for some guidance as to the defini-
tion of a “free appropriate public education.” Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, stated that there was no clear indication in
the IDEA of “any substantive standard prescribing the level of ed-
ucation to be accorded handicapped children,”75 and that special
educational services under the IDEA were only intended to pro-
vide meaningful access to public education, not a particular out-
come.76  Therefore, Justice Rehnquist concluded, the IDEA
guarantee of a free, appropriate public education consisted of a
threshold-level of educational opportunity:
Insofar as a State is required to provide a handicapped child
with a “free appropriate public education,” we hold that it satis-
fies this requirement by providing personalized instruction with
sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educa-
tionally from that instruction.77
This standard embodies what Rehnquist referred to as a “basic
floor of opportunity.”78  As long as the procedural requirements of
tailoring the IEP to provide an educational benefit to the child are
met, the school district satisfies the IDEA.
B. The Least Restrictive Environment: A Congressional
Preference for Mainstreaming
Complementary statutes and regulations govern the requirement
that school districts place disabled students in the “least restrictive
environment.”79  To receive federal funding through IDEA, states
must enact policies and procedures to ensure that:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities,
including children in public or private institutions or other care
74. See id.
75. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982).
76. See id. at 193.
77. Id. at 203.
78. Id. at 201.
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2004); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2) (2006)
(“Each public agency must ensure that . . . [t]o the maximum extent appropriate,
children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other
care facilities, are educated with children who are nondisabled; and [s]pecial classes,
separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only if the nature or severity of the disability is such
that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services can-
not be achieved satisfactorily.”).
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facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children
with disabilities from the regular educational environment oc-
curs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child
is such that education in regular classes with the use of supple-
mentary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.80
Compliance usually involves placing the disabled students with
nondisabled, or “typical” peers to the greatest degree that is rea-
sonably possible, a practice commonly known as “mainstreaming”
or “inclusion.”  Parents who disagree with the placement decision
of a school district may challenge the decision first at a “due pro-
cess hearing,”81 where a hearing officer considers the parties’ argu-
ments and can affirm or reject the placement decision and order
placement of the student consistent with the outcome of the hear-
ing.  Parents can use both the state and federal court system to
challenge the adequacy of the placement of their disabled child
with typical peers.82  The federal circuit courts of appeals, however,
apply different tests to evaluate school districts’ compliance with
§1412(a)(5)(A).  These tests are discussed in the next section.
C. The Circuit Tests for Compliance with
Mainstreaming Requirement
1. Roncker v. Walter
The mainstreaming requirement was first construed in 1983 by
the Sixth Circuit in Roncker v. Walter.83  In Roncker, the court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a student was placed in the least re-
strictive environment.84  Neill Roncker, a nine-year-old with severe
mental retardation, was placed in a public school exclusively for
the education of mentally retarded children after a previous recom-
80. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
81. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (“Whenever a complaint has been received under subsec-
tion (b)(6) or (k), the parents or the local educational agency involved in such com-
plaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be
conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency, as de-
termined by State law or by the State educational agency.”).
82. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (“Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made
under subsection (f) or (k) who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection
(g), and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection,
shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented
pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in
controversy.”).
83. See 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983).
84. See id. at 1060-61.
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mendation that he be placed in a “mainstream” school environ-
ment.85  Neill’s parents disagreed with the school district’s decision
and challenged Neill’s placement at a due process hearing,86 where
the hearing officer agreed with Neill’s parents that he “be placed
within the appropriate special education class in the regular ele-
mentary school setting.”87  The school district appealed the deci-
sion to the Ohio State Board of Education, which found that Neill
would receive an appropriate education at the school for the men-
tally retarded, but would also need interaction with non-disabled
students;88 Neill’s placement in the school for the mentally re-
tarded was subject to his receiving contact with non-disabled stu-
dents.  At the school Neill attended, his contact with non-disabled
students was limited to “lunch, gym and recess.”89  In a subsequent
lawsuit filed by Neill’s parents, both they and the school district
agreed that Neill could not be placed in a classroom with non-dis-
abled students.  Rather, the dispute revolved around providing
Neill special education in a setting where he would have greater
contact with non-disabled children.90
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the court noted the potential for
tension that the mainstreaming requirement created:
In some cases, a placement which may be considered better for
academic reasons may not be appropriate because of the failure
to provide for mainstreaming.  The perception that a segregated
institution is academically superior for a handicapped child may
reflect no more than a basic disagreement with the mainstream-
ing concept.  Such a disagreement is not, of course, any basis for
not following the Act’s mandate.91
To evaluate compliance with the “mainstreaming” requirement
in § 1412(a)(5)(A)92 the Sixth Circuit established its test: “[i]n a
case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court
should determine whether the services which make that placement
superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting.  If
they can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappro-
85. See id. at 1060.
86. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2004); see also supra text accompanying note
81. R




91. Id. at 1063.
92. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  At the time of the Roncker decision
the statute was called 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(b).
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priate under the Act.”93  The court noted that the disruptive effect
of the child on the classroom was a factor in this analysis and that
the costs of spending on one child to the detriment of the other
children weighed against mainstreaming.94  The Roncker court did
not expand on the consideration of costs, likely because costs were
not clearly raised as an issue at trial, although later cases have done
so.95  The Roncker test was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in A.W.
v. Northwest R-1 School District,96 and by the Fourth Circuit in
DeVries v. Fairfax County School Board.97
2. Daniel R.R.
In 1989, the Fifth Circuit adopted its own test of compliance with
the mainstreaming requirement of section 1412 in the case of
Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education.98  Daniel was a six-year-
old boy with Down’s syndrome whose parents enrolled him in a
special education program in the El Paso Independent School Dis-
trict.99  Seeking greater interaction for Daniel with nondisabled
peers, Daniel’s parents requested part-time placement in a regular
education pre-kindergarten classroom, while maintaining Daniel’s
part-time enrollment in the special education program.100  The
school district went forward with this placement program, but
Daniel’s teachers soon found that he required constant supervision
by faculty and that his progress with school work was minimal.101
This led the school district to revise Daniel’s placement, whereby
he would return to the special education program but, provided
adequate parental supervision, could eat lunch and play with
nondisabled peers three days per week.102  Daniel’s parents chal-
lenged this placement in both due process hearings and in district
court, both of which upheld the revised placement, relying princi-
93. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., A.W. v. R-1 Northwest Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 161-62 (8th Cir. 1987)
(noting that the evidence at trial indicated that school district funds were sufficiently
limited that hiring a teacher to benefit a disabled student would impact the ability to
educate other students in the district).
96. Id. at 163.
97. 882 F.2d 876, 878-79 (4th Cir. 1989).
98. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).




\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ506.txt unknown Seq: 17 29-OCT-08 12:39
2008] MAINSTREAMING AND AUTISM 1241
pally on the lack of educational benefit Daniel received in the reg-
ular classroom.103
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court considered Daniel’s ed-
ucational placement in light of the mainstreaming preference ar-
ticulated in section 1412.104  Notably, the court highlighted the
tension between the preference for mainstreaming and the need to
tailor the educational benefit to the child’s specific need:  “[t]he
nature or severity of some children’s handicaps is such that only
special education can address their needs.  For these children,
mainstreaming does not provide an education designed to meet
their unique needs and, thus, does not provide a free appropriate
public education.”105  The Fifth Circuit, however, stated that de-
spite differing abilities of disabled and nondisabled students, main-
streaming had potential inherent intangible benefits, for example,
language and behavior models available from nonhandicapped
children may be essential or helpful to the handicapped child’s de-
velopment.  In other words, although a handicapped child may not
be able to absorb all of the regular education curriculum, he may
benefit from nonacademic experiences in the regular education
environment.106
The concept of mainstreaming outweighing the placement that is
best for academic reasons is similar to the Roncker court’s analysis
as well: “[i]n some cases, a placement which may be considered
better for academic reasons may not be appropriate because of the
failure to provide for mainstreaming.”107  In its discussion of
Roncker, the Fifth Circuit stated that the Roncker test created too
great a judicial role in policy determinations that, it argued, were
best left to local school districts:
Certainly, the Roncker test accounts for factors that are impor-
tant in any mainstreaming case.  We believe, however, that the
test necessitates too intrusive an inquiry into the educational
103. See id. at 1040.
104. See id. at 1043-51.
105. Id. at 1044.
106. Id. at 1048. The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education noted that
education segregation on the basis of such immutable characteristics as race “gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494 (1954).  This sentiment seems to be reflected in Roncker and Daniel
R.R. in the movement in special education away from placing disabled students in
segregated educational environments because of the perception of potential inherent
stigma of separated special education, and also because of the potential benefits to
disabled students of inclusion with their nondisabled peers.
107. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
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policy choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local
school officials.  Whether a particular service feasibly can be
provided in a regular or special education setting is an adminis-
trative determination that state and local school officials are far
better qualified and situated than are we to make.108
Instead, the Fifth Circuit found that “language of the [IDEA]
itself provides a workable test for determining whether a state has
complied with the [IDEA’s] mainstreaming requirement.”109  Rely-
ing on the statutory language, the Fifth Circuit fashioned a two-
part test.
First, a court is to examine whether education in a regular class-
room can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child with the use of
supplementary aids and services.110  Four elements111 comprise this
first inquiry:
(1) The steps the school district has taken to accommodate the
child in a regular classroom;
(2) Whether the child will receive an educational benefit from
regular education;
(3) The child’s overall educational experience in regular
education;
(4) The effect the disabled child’s presence has on the regular
classroom.
A fifth element was subsequently added by the Eleventh Circuit
in Greer v. Rome112 in adopting the Daniel R.R. test:
(5) The impact of the cost of educating a handicapped child in a
regular classroom upon the education of other children in
the district.113
Second, if the first element cannot be met and the school intends
to provide special education or to remove the child from regular
education, the court will then ask whether the school has main-
streamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.114  To sat-
isfy this second prong the school must take intermediate steps
where appropriate, such as placing the child in regular education
for some academic classes and in special education for others,
108. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1046.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1048.
111. See id. at 1048-49.
112. 950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991).
113. Id. at 697 (“If the cost of educating a handicapped child in a regular classroom
is so great that it would significantly impact upon the education of other children in
the district, then education in a regular classroom is not appropriate.”).
114. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050.
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mainstreaming the child for nonacademic classes only, or providing
interaction with nonhandicapped children during lunch and
recess.115
This is a subjective standard, as indicated by the language
“whether education in [a] regular classroom . . . can be achieved
satisfactorily for a given child.”116  In addition to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Greer,117 the Third Circuit also adopted the Daniel R.R. test
in Oberti v. Board of Education.118
3. Holland
Rachel Holland was a mentally disabled second grader who had
been in a variety of special education programs for four years.119
Her parents had requested that Rachel be provided more time in a
mainstream classroom,120  and the school district proposed placing
Rachel in regular classrooms for nonacademic classes such as art,
music, lunch and recess while Rachel would remain in the special
education classroom for her academic classes.121  In response,
Rachel’s parents enrolled her in a private school for her second
grade year.122  At the same time, her parents challenged the school
district’s IEP at a due process hearing, where the hearing officer
agreed with Rachel’s parents that the district’s proposed placement
was inadequate.123  The school district appealed the hearing of-
ficer’s decision to the district court.124  The trial court relied on
both Roncker and Daniel R.R. in fashioning a four-pronged test125
of compliance with section 1412(a)(5)(A):
(1) The educational benefits of full-time placement in a regular
class;
(2) The non-academic benefits of such placement;
(3) The effect the student has on the teacher and children in the
regular class;
(4) The costs of mainstreaming the student.
115. See id. at 1048-50.
116. Id. at 1048; see Ralph E. Julnes, The New Holland and Other Tests for Resolv-
ing LRE Disputes, 91 EDUC. L. REP. 789, 795-96 (1994).
117. Greer, 950 F.2d at 688.
118. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).







125. Id. at 1400-01.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ506.txt unknown Seq: 20 29-OCT-08 12:39
1244 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
This four-pronged test comprises elements from both Roncker
and Daniel R.R.  In applying this test, the district court affirmed
the decision of the hearing officer and the school district ap-
pealed.126  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted the district court’s
test of compliance with section 1412 and affirmed the decision
below.127
4. Summary of the Circuit Tests
The circuit tests of compliance with the mainstreaming require-
ment of the IDEA are each based on factors that the circuit court
felt were relevant to the analysis, derived from the language of the
IDEA, or some of both.  The factors are summarized in Table 1.
Roncker Daniel R.R. Holland
Factors that make segre- Educational benefit of Educational benefit of
gated facility considered mainstreaming placement
superior; as applied,
Overall educational benefits Non-academic benefits of
of mainstreaming placementthese are essentially the
same as the benefits of
mainstreaming compared to
special education
Disruptive effect of place- Impact of the child’s pres- Impact on other students/
ment on other students ence on classroom teacher
Cost of placement Cost of placement Cost of placement
TABLE 1.  COMPARISON OF THE FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT TESTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION
1412(A)(5)(A).
One factor common to all of these tests is cost.128  Placements
will be undermined where the cost of placing a disabled student is
too great, either because the services the child would require are
simply too costly to provide in the mainstream setting, or because
using funds to provide the services would adversely impact the ser-
vices available for a disabled student’s peers.129  For example, in
126. Id. at 1402.
127. See id. at 1404.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 94, 113, and 125.
129. See, e.g., Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Cost is a
proper factor to consider since excessive spending on one handicapped child deprives
other children.”); see also A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 161-62 (8th
Cir. 1987) (“The evidence before the Court shows that the funds available are limited
so that placing a teacher at House Springs for the benefit of a few students at best,
and possibly only A.W., would directly reduce the educational benefits provided to
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Holland, the school district argued that it would “lose significant
funding if Rachel [Holland] did not spend at least 51% of her time
in a special education class.”130 Holland provides further evidence
that this cost analysis can be complex; services that benefit one dis-
abled child may in fact benefit many of his or her disabled peers,
and thus it may be inappropriate to assign the entirety of the cost
of such services to the child at issue.131
A second common factor is that of disruptive effects of the dis-
abled child on classroom environments, and recognition that teach-
ers cannot devote the entirety of their time to a single student.132
This factor is reflected in the Code of Federal Regulations.133  Al-
though certain behaviors, such as screaming, kicking, biting, or
other outbursts can be disruptive, the facts of several cases indicate
that schools reconsider the student’s placement where these are re-
peated patterns of behavior.134 The student need not clearly be dis-
ruptive per se; if a student’s needs are such that he or she requires
an inordinate amount of attention from the teacher or aide, this
behavior may fall into the “disruptive” category.135
The other factors considered by Holland and Daniel R.R. involve
the educational benefits of the placement in the mainstream class-
room and either the “overall” benefits of mainstreaming or the
“non-academic” benefits.136 Roncker compares the factors that
make a segregated facility superior to the mainstream facility, and
analyzes whether these factors can be feasibly integrated into the
other handicapped students by increasing the number of students taught by a single
teacher at [State School No. 2].”).
130. Holland, 14 F.3d at 1402.  Another example of costs raised in Holland was
school-wide sensitivity training that cost $80,000. Id.  It is important to note that the
Ninth Circuit did not directly evaluate many of these cost arguments, because the
Circuit indicated that the record did not provide sufficient evidence to support these
arguments. See id.  They are presented here only as examples of the kinds of cost
arguments school districts might make against mainstreaming.
131. See id.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 94, 111, and 125.
133. 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A, ¶ 24 (“[W]here a handicapped child is so disruptive
in a regular classroom that the education of other students is significantly impaired,
the needs of the handicapped child cannot be met in that environment. Therefore,
regular placement would not be appropriate to his or her needs.”).
134. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1058; Light v. Parkway C-2 Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 1223,
1229 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that the risk that an autistic student will cause injury is an
important factor in determining whether that student may remain at the educational
facility during IDEA disputes).
135. See, e.g., Beth B. v. Van Clay, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(noting student’s needs demanded attention from classroom staff and periodically re-
moved the teacher from the rest of the class).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 125. R
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mainstream facility.137  Several commentators suggest that these
“educational experience” factors distinguish favorability of the
tests.138  Although phrased in different terms between the three cir-
cuit tests, Part III of this Note argues that, at least as applied to
cases involving autistic children, they comprise essentially the same
inquiries.
III. EVALUATION OF THE CIRCUIT TESTS AND OF THE IDEA
MAINSTREAMING REQUIREMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTISTIC
SPECTRUM DISORDERS
A. The Circuit Tests as Equivalents in the Context of
Autistic Students
Scholarly commentary on the split of the federal circuit courts in
the test used to evaluate compliance with the mainstreaming re-
quirement of the IDEA has generally expressed a preference for
one test over the others, often on the grounds that the higher de-
gree of specificity in the factors considered by—for example Hol-
land and not Roncker—is of value to the courts.139  Other
commentary echoes the concern that each of the circuit tests “in-
vite judicial scrutiny of school district [mainstreaming] deci-
sions.”140  Examination of case law that follows these circuit tests
allows for an evaluation of whether—at least in the context of au-
tistic students—there are substantive differences in the circuit tests,
as applied.
1. As Applied, the Tests Account for Substantially
Similar Factors
As indicated in Table 1, the specific factors that the tests consid-
ered are substantially similar.141 For example, although Roncker
did not expressly include consideration of the academic and nonac-
ademic benefits, the broad language of the test, coupled with
court’s acknowledgement that nonacademic factors are often sig-
nificant elements in deciding the appropriate academic placement,
137. See supra text accompanying note 93.
138. See Julnes, supra note 116, at 806. R
139. See, e.g., Kevin D. Stanley, A Model for Interpretation of Mainstreaming Com-
pliance under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Board of Education v.
Holland, 65 UMKC L. REV. 303, 311-17 (1996).
140. See Julnes, supra note 116, at 805.
141. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), the
Supreme Court allowed that “linguistic differences” may not really impact the appli-
cation of judicial tests. Id. at 40-41 (“[T]he particular linguistic framework used is less
important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry . . . .”).
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imply that such factors should be considered.142  Both Daniel R.R.
and Holland expressly consider these factors.143  Further, all three
circuit tests consider the impact of the child on the classroom envi-
ronment, and each test includes the cost of the child’s placement as
a factor.144
As an indication of how similar the Roncker and Daniel R.R.
tests are, in S. v. Scarborough School Committee,145 the district
court considered a challenge to a student’s bus route as violating
the IDEA’s least restrictive environment requirement.  Although
student transportation is not clearly part of student placement or
mainstreaming, the court discussed both the Roncker and Daniel
R.R. tests in its decision.146  The court noted that the Roncker and
Daniel R.R. tests both encompass a comparison of the benefits in
the mainstream versus the segregated environment and that both
tests account for the effect of mainstreaming disabled students on
nondisabled students.147  As noted above in Table 1, both tests cur-
rently account for the cost of mainstreaming a disabled student as
well. The court further commented that the outcome of its analysis
was the same under the Roncker test and the Daniel R.R. test, pro-
viding evidence that the test that a court applies is not clearly out-
come-determinative.148
Another example of the similarity between these tests is found in
D.F. v. Western School Corporation,149 where the court described
the circuit tests in a manner that suggests their equivalence.  For
example, the court noted that as between the Daniel R.R. and Hol-
land tests:
Whether the test is stated in two pans [sic] or four factors, the
standards are very similar.  The Daniel R.R. test states the stan-
dard in terms very close to the statutory terms.  The Holland
factors identify more specific levels of inquiry for applying the
142. The Sixth Circuit in Roncker notes that the IDEA mainstreaming requirement
includes “non-academic activities such as lunch, gym, recess and transportation to and
from school.” Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 n.6 (6th Cir. 1983).  The court
also noted that the evaluation of the appropriateness of a school placement needed to
consider whether the school could provide services for Neill that supported his emo-
tional and physical needs, which are not clearly “academic” factors, such as efficacy of
the teaching methods at issue in Rowley. Id. at 1063.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 125.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 94, 113, and 125.
145. S. v. Scarborough Co. Sch. Comm., 366 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Me. 2005).
146. See id. at 101-04.
147. See id. at 101-04.
148. See id. at 104 n.9.
149. D.F. v. W. Sch. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
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more general Daniel R.R. standard . . . .  This court will apply
the two part test stated in Daniel R.R. and Oberti, but will or-
ganize its discussion in terms of the four Holland factors.150
This quotation suggests that the court was able to use the Hol-
land and Daniel R.R. tests interchangeably.  From this perspective,
despite textual differences between the tests, the factors considered
are substantially the same.
2. The Circuit Tests Are Applied with Equal Deference to Local
Educational Officials
Another potential difference between the circuit tests is their de-
gree of deference to state and local educational authorities.  Specif-
ically, the Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. expressed concern that the
Roncker test invited too much judicial second-guessing of school
district decisions.151  The very nature of cases in which parents and
school districts disagree on placement of a child, however, requires
judicial consideration, and in some instances second-guessing, of
school district decisions.  Although the Daniel R.R. and Holland
tests describe specific factors of the placement rather than discuss-
ing a comparison of segregated and mainstream facilities, it is not
clear that these tests create any less risk of judicial second-guess-
ing.  As discussed below, courts that have relied on Roncker,
Daniel R.R. and Holland have made some judgment as to the ap-
propriateness of the school district’s placement decision.
It is important to note that there are several points at which
school and state officials review the appropriate placement of a dis-
abled child.  An initial point of review is through annual monitor-
ing of a child’s educational progress in his or her current
placement.  This is usually accomplished by the child’s educators in
conjunction with school district officials and, in some instances, ed-
ucational experts.152  A second point of review can occur if parents
challenge the adequacy of  proposed placement at a due process
hearing.  As discussed in Part I, at due process hearings an inde-
150. Id. at 567.
151. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We
respectfully decline to follow the Sixth Circuit’s analysis. Certainly, the Roncker test
accounts for factors that are important in any mainstreaming case. We believe, how-
ever, that the test necessitates too intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy
choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local school officials.”).
152. This annual monitoring is a part of the IDEA’s requirement that each disabled
child be provided with an Individualized Education Program (IEP) that is developed
by the child’s educators in coordination with the parents.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)
(2004).
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pendent hearing officer (“IHO”) reviews the record and makes a
determination of (among any other issues in dispute) whether the
proposed placement comports with the mainstreaming require-
ments of the IDEA.153  In some cases, a state level review officer
(“SLRO”) may review the findings of the hearing officer, providing
another point of decision by the state educational officials.154  Each
of these local and state decisions are subject to review by courts,
and it is these decisions that fall under the admonition of Rowley,
that courts must not “substitute their own notions of sound educa-
tional policy for those of the school authorities which they re-
view.”155  The above examination of cases involving children with
an ASD diagnosis indicates that courts across the circuits generally
abide the Rowley admonition.  Where they have failed to do so, the
cases discussed above indicate that the appeals courts have re-
versed their decisions.156
3. Decisions Applying the Roncker Test Highlight Judicial
Deference to the Educational Placement Decisions of
State and Local Officials
As indicated above, courts following the Roncker analysis ob-
serve deference to state and local decisions regarding educational
placement.  For example, in Hartmann v. Loudon County Board of
Education,157 the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court’s finding
that a school placement decision failed the mainstreaming require-
ment of the IDEA, in large part because the district court failed to
defer to the findings of the state educational officials.158  The case
centered on the educational placement of Mark Hartmann, an
eleven-year-old student diagnosed with autism159 who had signifi-
cant impairments in his learning, communication and social abili-
ties.  The school officials observed that Mark’s impairments were
such that he was merely an observer in mainstream academic clas-
153. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  As discussed above, due process
hearings are a means by which parents may challenge the proposed IEP.
154. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2) (2004).
155. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
156. See supra Part III.A.
157. 118 F.3d 996 (4th Cir. 1997).
158. See id. at 1001 (“After careful examination of the record, however, we are
forced to conclude that the district court’s decision fails to account for the administra-
tive findings and is not supported by the evidence based on a correct application of
the law.  In effect, the court simply substituted its own judgment regarding [the plain-
tiff’s] proper educational program for that of local school officials.”).
159. Id. at 999.
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ses160  and that his behaviors were often disruptive.161  The school
district proposed placing Mark in a self-contained classroom specif-
ically designed to provide for the needs of autistic students within a
mainstream school, thereby facilitating interaction with nondis-
abled peers.162  Mark’s parents rejected the proposed IEP as violat-
ing the mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA.163  At a
subsequent due process hearing, the local hearing officer found
that the IEP in fact complied with the IDEA, and provided the
appropriate educational benefit to Mark.164  After this finding was
affirmed by the state hearing officer, the Hartmanns brought suit in
district court.165
The Hartmanns prevailed at trial, where the district court dis-
counted the credibility of the school district’s witness testimony re-
garding the minimal educational benefit that Mark received in a
regular classroom.166  On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the school
district prevailed.167  Citing its adoption of the Roncker test in
DeVries,168 the Fourth Circuit stated that the district court erred in
the lack of deference it gave to the testimony of Mark’s educators
that he was not receiving an educational benefit in the regular
classroom.  In highlighting this lack of deference to state and local
educational decisions, the Fourth Circuit reiterated the Supreme
Court’s statement that district courts should not consider IDEA
cases an “invitation . . . to substitute their own notions of sound
education policy for those of the school authorities which they re-
view.”169  The Fourth Circuit indicated that the district court vio-
lated this principle of deference by virtually disregarding the
testimony of Mark’s educators.170
160. Id. at 1001-02.  The court also noted the similarity between the concerns of the
educators in Mark Hartmann’s school and those expressed by the educational profes-
sionals in DeVries.  See id. (citing DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876,
879 (4th Cir. 1989)).
161. Id. at 999.  Mark’s behavioral problems included kicking, biting, and
screaming.





167. See id. at 1005.
168. See id. at 1004.
169. Id. at 1000 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)).
170. See id. at 1001 (“These principles reflect the IDEA’s recognition that federal
courts cannot run local schools.  Local educators deserve latitude in determining the
individualized education program most appropriate for a disabled child.  The IDEA
does not deprive these educators of the right to apply their professional judgment.”).
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Hartmann and other cases that have applied the Roncker test
demonstrate that courts will defer to state and local educational
placement decisions where the state has concluded that the IDEA
is satisfied.171  Importantly, this judicial deference is not one-sided;
deference is also found when state educational officials reject
school district placement decisions as violating the IDEA main-
streaming requirement.  For example, in Centerville City School
District v. Goldman,172 a district court affirmed a finding by the
state educational officer that a school district’s proposed placement
violated the IDEA.173  Michael Goldman was a child diagnosed
with autism whose parents strongly disagreed with his placement in
a special education environment as it failed to provide for main-
streaming.174  At a due process hearing on Michael’s placement,
the hearing officer upheld Michael’s placement as satisfying the
mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA, but this finding was sub-
sequently reversed by a state level review officer (“SLRO”).175
The school board appealed this decision to the district court.176
The district court applied the Roncker test, affirming the SLRO’s
decision that Michael’s placement violated the IDEA’s main-
streaming requirement.177  The court noted that, as required by the
The court also cited its own precedent of deference to school district decisions: “
[a]dministrative findings in an IDEA case ‘are entitled to be considered prima facie
correct,’ and ‘the district court, if it is not going to follow them, is required to explain
why it does not.’” Id. at 1000-01 (quoting Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953
F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991)).
171. See DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989) (deferring
to a state educational placement decision for a seventeen-year-old student with au-
tism where the evidence in record supported the school district’s assertion that the
student could not be provided appropriate services at a mainstream school); see also
Pachl v. Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing the importance of defer-
ence to state and local educational officials in educational placement decisions);
Tucker v. Calloway County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 505 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
Education of the Handicapped Act [a forerunner of IDEA] mandates an education
that is responsive to the handicapped child’s needs, ‘but leaves the substance and the
details of that education to state and local school officials.’” (quoting Barnett v.
Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 1991))).  In Pachl, the Eight Cir-
cuit also noted other similar precedent acknowledging the idea that judges are to
avoid second-guessing of school districts, “‘[b]ecause judges are not trained educa-
tors, judicial review under the IDEA is limited.’” Pachl, 453 F.3d at 1068 (quoting
E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998)).
172. No. C-3-92-442, 1993 WL 1318610 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 1993).
173. See id. at *2.
174. See id. at *9-10.
175. See id. at *15.
176. Id. at *16.
177. See id. at *22-26.
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standard of review set forth in Roncker, courts should defer to the
SLRO’s decision with a “rebuttable presumption of validity.”178
These examples indicate that courts applying the Roncker test
are cognizant of the risk of judicial second-guessing of state poli-
cies, and where such practice occurs, it is corrected on appeal.
These examples thus tend to rebut the concern expressed by the
Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. and by commentators that Roncker cre-
ates too great a risk of judicial “second-guessing” of state and local
educational decisions.  The following section argues that the degree
of deference to state and local educational decisions in the applica-
tion of the Daniel R.R. or Holland tests is not clearly different from
the cases above that have applied Roncker.
4. The Daniel R.R. and Holland Tests Are not Clearly More
Deferential than the Roncker Test to Educational
Placement District Decisions
In 2001, the district court of Illinois heard the case of Beth B. v.
Van Clay.179  Beth B. was a thirteen-year-old girl diagnosed with
Rett’s syndrome, one of the autistic spectrum disorders.180  Beth’s
school district proposed placing Beth in a self-contained classroom
staffed by teachers who possessed specialized training in educating
students  with “severe cognitive and communicative disabilities.”181
Beth’s parents rejected this proposal, and after a due process hear-
ing on the matter concluded in favor of the school district, Beth’s
parents sought review of the decision in district court.182  The dis-
trict court noted that the Seventh Circuit had not yet spoken on
which of the existing circuit tests it preferred in determining com-
pliance with the IDEA mainstreaming requirement.183  Interest-
ingly, the district court expressly stated its preference for the
Daniel R.R. test because it agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s assess-
ment of the Roncker test as “too intrusive” into the decisions of
state and local education officials.184  The court, however, pro-
ceeded to apply both the Daniel R.R. test and the Roncker test
because the Seventh Circuit had not spoken definitively on the is-
178. Id. at *16 (citing Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983)).
179. 211 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
180. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
181. Beth B., 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1030.
184. Id. (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir.
1989)).
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sue.185  In applying the Daniel R.R. test, the court examined the
school district’s efforts to accommodate Beth and the educational
benefit Beth would receive in the regular classroom, finding that
the school district complied with the IDEA, having designed a spe-
cialized curriculum for Beth.186  In considering the academic bene-
fits of the regular classroom, the court noted the “stark factual
dispute” about Beth’s progress in class.  The court conducted its
own review of her progress, concluding that the record showed
Beth’s greatest gains were associated with the special education en-
vironment, and that Beth would merely be an observer in the regu-
lar classroom.187  This point is notable because an independent
judicial review of a student’s progress appears directly counter to
the warnings of Rowley, that courts are not to substitute to their
own judgment for that of state and local educational officials. After
considering the non-academic188 and disruption189  factors, the
court concluded that under the Daniel R.R. test, the school district
had mainstreamed Beth to the maximum degree appropriate by
placing her in a special education environment and that her place-
ment in a regular classroom would not benefit her.190
The court then proceeded to analyze the record under the
Roncker test. The special education environment was found supe-
rior to the regular classroom for many of the same reasons that the
court dismissed the minimal benefit to Beth of being in the regular
classroom.191 Beth B. thus rebuts the position that the Roncker test
is less deferential to state educational officials than the Daniel R.R.
test.  If the Roncker test were more intrusive than the Daniel R.R.
or Holland test, a case that involves the application of the Roncker
185. The district court noted that the Seventh Circuit had discussed the Roncker
and Daniel R.R. tests previously, but had not endorsed either test. Id. at 1030 (citing
Monticello Sch. Dist, No. 25 v. George L., 102 F.3d 895, 905 (7th Cir. 1996)).  The
court also discussed another recent Seventh Circuit case that yet again declined to
endorse one of the existing circuit tests of mainstreaming. Id. at 1030 (citing
LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 105 v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 184 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1999)).
186. See id. at 1027 (“We agree with the [hearing officer] that the district acted
reasonably in developing Beth’s placement.”).
187. See id. at 1032.
188. See id. at 1033 (indicating that Beth’s social contacts in the regular classroom
might provide some benefit, but that as she grew older, contact she would reasonably
expect to gain with regular peers would diminish, especially as the style of teaching
shifted to lecturing over in-class cooperation).
189. See id. (finding that Beth’s needs demanded attention from the teacher and
aides in her classroom, which ultimately detracted from attention given to remainder
of class).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1034.
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test and the Daniel R.R. test, for example, would be more likely to
apply differing levels of scrutiny.  In Beth B., the court made essen-
tially the same inquiry under both the Roncker and Daniel R.R.
tests, a fact that tends to refute the suggestion that Roncker is less
deferential than the Daniel R.R. test.  Although it is possible that
the court’s application of the Roncker test was deferential merely
because the court expressly stated its concern about the intrusive-
ness of the Roncker test, it is not clear from the text of Beth B. that
the court applied Roncker any differently than courts that have ex-
pressly adopted Roncker.
The Holland192 case itself suggests that the Roncker test is at
least as deferential a test to state and local educational decisions as
either the Daniel R.R. or Holland test.  In Holland, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s findings that testimony from ex-
pert witnesses for Rachel was more credible than witnesses for the
school district. This finding contrasts with the application of the
Roncker test in Hartmann, which concluded that the findings of
schools “are entitled to be considered prima facie correct.”193  This
language from Hartmann indicates that a court applying the
Roncker test can give great deference to school district decisions.
The Holland case indicates that courts applying its test may not
always do so.
These examples counter the idea that the Roncker test creates
too intrusive an inquiry into state and local education decisions.  In
each of the cases discussed that applied Roncker, the court ex-
pressly recognized the principle that courts should not engage in
second-guessing of state and local officials.  Further, in each of the
cases the school district’s proposed placement of a child diagnosed
with autism ultimately prevailed.  Thus, an examination of the
Roncker test as applied reveals a standard of review that appears at
least as deferential to state and local educational decisions as the
standard in the Daniel R.R. and Holland tests, rather than the judi-
cial second-guessing initially raised by the Fifth Circuit in Daniel
R.R.
If the circuit tests are equivalent as applied in the context of au-
tistic students, the critical issue is whether these tests effectively
evaluate the factors comprising the “least restrictive environment”
for a child with autism, and further, whether mainstreaming is fun-
damentally less important for children with autism.  Because au-
192. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
193. Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (8th Cir.
1997) (quoting Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991)).
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tism involves, among other things, deficits in social behavior,
understanding how autistic children perceive social isolation and
inclusion should be considered in evaluating the mainstreaming re-
quirement in the context of autistic students.  The following section
discusses the tensions between the behavioral deficits observed in
children diagnosed with autism and the mainstreaming require-
ment of the IDEA.
B. Tensions Between the Underlying Principles of the
Mainstreaming Requirement and the Clinical Features
of Autistic Spectrum Disorders
The underlying principles of the mainstreaming requirement are
not stated in the statutory text of section 1412.  In a recent article,
Professor Ruth Colker suggests that the mainstreaming require-
ment was a response to a wide-spread practice of institutionalizing
disabled students.194  The mainstreaming requirement “was devel-
oped to close disability-only warehouses for children and en-
courage school districts to develop more humane environments in
which children with disabilities could attain an appropriate and ad-
equate education.”195  This perspective thus contemplates a very
different factual scenario than those encountered in the cases lead-
ing to the circuit tests above.196  Even if, as Professor Colker ar-
gues, mainstreaming has roots in the movement away from
deinstitutionalization, the modern incarnation of the mainstream-
ing requirement reflects broader concerns that segregated educa-
tion of disabled students—even in “self-contained” classrooms at
194. Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption:  Thirty Years Later, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 789, 789 (2006).
195. Id. at 810.
196. For example, the Third Circuit in Oberti interprets the mainstreaming require-
ment as focusing on the difference between placement in a regular classroom and
placement outside of a regular classroom, such as a self-contained classroom for spe-
cial education, not between placing a student in an institution and a regular school:
We construe IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement to prohibit a school from
placing a child with disabilities outside of a regular classroom if educating
the child in the regular classroom, with supplementary aids and support ser-
vices, can be achieved satisfactorily.  In addition, if placement outside of a
regular classroom is necessary for the child to receive educational benefit,
the school may still be violating IDEA if it has not made sufficient efforts to
include the child in school programs with nondisabled children whenever
possible.
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993).
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regular schools—will risk stigmatization.197  Further, it reflects the
idea that mainstreaming has important non-academic benefits,
such as the development of age-appropriate peer networks and so-
cial behaviors.198  For several reasons discussed below, it may be
appropriate to relax the mainstreaming requirement in the context
of children with ASD because of the inherent tensions between the
underlying principles of mainstreaming and the clinical features of
autism.
The potential for stigmatization resulting from segregated special
education is offered as one factor in support of a mainstreaming
requirement.  This Note proposes, however, that stigmatization can
be described from at least two perspectives, the first is egocentric,
from the standpoint of the disabled child, while the second is ex-
trinsic, from the perspective of peers, teacher or possibly parents.
Interestingly, Professor Colker cites studies finding that special ed-
ucation students can perceive their placement positively, sug-
gesting that some disabled students do not associate a stigma with
their education.199  In the context of autistic children, the scientific
literature suggests that children with ASD do not tend to report
accurately social acceptance nor do they appear to express loneli-
ness despite lower social acceptance.  For example, one study sug-
gests that many “highly-functioning” children diagnosed with ASD
are in fact objectively less socially accepted by their peers, but that
the children diagnosed with ASD report low levels of loneliness
and social rejection.200  If one goal of mainstreaming is to minimize
197. See, e.g., id. at 1217 n.24 (“Teaching nondisabled children to work and commu-
nicate with children with disabilities may do much to eliminate the stigma, mistrust
and hostility that have traditionally been harbored against persons with disabilities.”).
198. These concerns are evident in the discussion of most case law that has followed
the development of the circuit tests of compliance with mainstreaming.  In Daniel
R.R., the Fifth Circuit clearly conceived of the social benefits of mainstreaming as a
part of an academic benefit: “[L]anguage and behavior models available from non-
handicapped children may be essential or helpful to the handicapped child’s develop-
ment.  In other words, although a handicapped child may not be able to absorb all of
the regular education curriculum, he may benefit from nonacademic experiences in
the regular education environment.”  Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d
1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 14
F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994) (“evidence indicated that [the disabled student] had
developed her social and communications skills as well as her self-confidence from
placement in a regular class.”); Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1002 (noting that social devel-
opment is an important consideration in educational placement decisions, although it
should not “outweigh . . . failure to progress academically in the regular classroom”).
199. See Colker, supra note 194, at 833-34. R
200. See, e.g., Brandt Chamberlain et al., Involvement or Isolation?  The Social Net-
works of Children with Autism in Regular Classrooms, 37 J. AUTISM DEV. DISORDERS
230, 240 (2001) (finding that children with autism show a “happy obliviousness” to
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any stigmatizing effects the disabled child might perceive, the find-
ing that ASD children do not appear to report loneliness or social
rejection would tend to diminish the importance of mainstreaming
for these students.  Further, peers and teachers of children with
ASD report “burn out” experiences from efforts to include these
children in classroom activities.201  Because each of the circuits
considers the effects of mainstreaming on the other students, such
“burn out” effects should be another factor that diminishes the im-
portance of mainstreaming children with ASD where there are
placements that afford appropriate educational benefits.
This potential for diminished importance of mainstreaming is re-
inforced by the fact that most of the treatments for autism require
extensive time spent in a one-on-one environment with the thera-
pist.  For example, the ABA and TEACCH methods of therapy
involve substantial one-on-one interactions between the child and
the clinician, outside of the mainstream classroom environment.202
Typically, the recommendation indicates forty hours per week of
therapy.203  These therapies may thus run directly counter to the
goals of section 1412(a)(5)(A).  For example, in Gill v. Columbia,
the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court and the school dis-
trict that an IEP providing for thirty-five to forty hours per week of
home-based ABA therapy violated the mainstreaming requirement
because it would not allow an autistic child sufficient interaction
with non-disabled peers.204  If the child in Gill would not truly have
benefited from mainstreaming due to the social impairments ob-
served in autism, then the court’s emphasis on mainstreaming as a
basis for rejecting an IEP that included behavioral therapy was a
disservice to the child.
Another factor that, if true, would minimize the importance of
mainstreaming in the context of children with ASD is the efficacy
of the current treatment methods at developing social skills.  One
their social status).  One important caveat in interpreting these studies is that they are
limited to highly-functioning ASD children whose parents have provided consent to
participation.  The sample may not include children whose parents would not consent
out of fears that participation might highlight or exacerbate their child’s social isola-
tion.  This could thus skew the measurement of how ASD children experience a main-
stream classroom environment.
201. See, e.g., Shunit Reiter & Taly Vitan, Inclusion of Pupils with Autism:  The
Effect of An Intervention Program on the Regular Pupils’ Burnout, Attitudes and
Quality of Mediation, 11 AUTISM 321, 321 (2007).
202. See supra Part I.
203. See Sallows & Graupner, supra note 22, at 420-21. R
204. See, e.g., Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1033, 1038 (8th Cir.
2000).
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recent study questions the efficacy of the behavioral therapies used
to treat children with ASD.205  Luckett raises the criticism that
“successful” behavioral intervention is often measured by an in-
crease in the number of “correct” responses by the child, while ig-
noring the cognitive underpinnings that motivate the performance
of the correct response.206  For example, if a therapist asks a child
to make eye contact with her, the “correct” response would be to
make such eye contact.  If, over time, the child increases the num-
ber of “correct” responses, the therapy could be considered suc-
cessful.  Luckett criticizes this interpretation of “success” because
the therapy may not increase the child’s intrinsic desire to make
eye contact, the child is merely performing a conditioned behav-
ioral response.207  This criticism has important consequences for
the mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA in the context of au-
tism.  If, as Luckett cautions, behavioral therapies do not improve
the intrinsic desire for social interaction and instead merely result
in the increased frequency of the “correct” conditioned responses
to social cues, then concerns about reducing the impact of social
rejection and isolation would become less relevant.  In this scena-
rio, the other benefits of behavioral therapies, such as communica-
tion skills, would remain valuable, tending to provide the
educational benefit that outweighs the potentially minimal or non-
existent benefits of mainstreaming.
One caveat is that if being outside of the mainstream classroom
has a larger negative effect on the autistic child’s social develop-
ment than is currently believed, the therapeutic approaches cur-
rently used would be more likely to violate the mainstreaming
requirement, since they involve removing the child from the social
environment of the classroom.  There are reports that autistic chil-
dren do become socially isolated and also report feelings of social
rejection and loneliness.208  Additionally, children whose diagnosis
is more severe or whose socioeconomic or cultural background is
at significant variance from the classroom norm may experience
the classroom environment very differently than highly-functioning
205. See Tim Luckett et al., Do Behavioral Approaches Teach Children with Autism
to Play or Are They Just Pretending?, 11 AUTISM 365 (2007).
206. See id. at 369.
207. See id.  It is important to note that the authors do not argue that children with
autism are incapable of developing social desires, rather that the specific behavioral
techniques are not effective at promoting such development.
208. See Elinor Ochs et al., Inclusion as Social Practice: Views of Children with Au-
tism, 10 SOC. DEV. 399 (2001).
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ASD children, making it difficult to accurately predict the impact
of mainstreaming without further study.209
Interestingly, the circuit courts have in several instances ap-
proved IEPs that involve such time intensive, one-on-one behav-
ioral therapies,210 indicating that courts are approving of
placements that provide the greater therapeutic benefit to the stu-
dents even though such therapy removes the students from the
mainstream classroom.  The issue is whether the child has been
mainstreamed to the “maximum extent appropriate.”211  In some
cases, the “appropriate” degree of mainstreaming may be quite
limited.  For example, in Hartmann, the court appeared to accord
less importance to the mainstreaming requirement than to a mean-
ingful educational benefit, stating that the “IDEA encourages
mainstreaming, but only to the extent that it does not prevent a
child from receiving educational benefit.”212  In the context of an
ASD diagnosis, mainstreaming is arguably not as critical as an ap-
propriate educational benefit, especially where concerns about
stigmatization and delays in development of social behaviors are
not clearly warranted.
These issues present a difficult challenge for a court hearing an
IDEA case.  Although Rowley established that the court be defer-
ential to the decisions of the state and local school officials, the
court should take notice of credible findings that the efficacy of
commonly used behavioral therapies depend on the child’s pre-
treatment characteristics.213  This is true because the IEP must be
tailored to the specific child’s needs.214  For example, if pretreat-
ment characteristics mean that the child will not benefit beyond a
209. See Sandra K. M. Tsang et al., Application of the TEACCH Program on Chi-
nese Pre-School Children with Autism:  Does Culture Make a Difference?, 37 J. AU-
TISM DEV. DISORDER 390, 391 (2007).
210. See, e.g., Pachl v. Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064, 1069 n.4 (8th Cir. 2006) (approving
of IEP that included segregated classroom applying the TEACCH method); see also
Hartmann v. Loudon Co. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 1005 (4th Cir. 1997) (approving
of segregated educational placement for child with autism, and noting that the “IDEA
encourages mainstreaming, but only to the extent that it does not prevent a child from
receiving educational benefit”). Contra  Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027,
1033 (8th Cir. 2000).
211. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2004).
212. Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1005.
213. See Sallows & Graupner, supra note 22.  Sallows & Graupner reported that R
the strongest predictors of treatment outcomes were the pretreatment degrees of imi-
tation, socialization, language and daily living skills.  The authors report the ability to
predict with ninety-one percent accuracy whether a child would be a “rapid” or “mod-
erate” learner. Id. at 434.
214. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. R
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certain amount of therapy, an IEP that extends therapy well be-
yond the effective amount would potentially not be tailored to the
specific child’s needs.  This does not mean that courts should vio-
late the principle of deference to state and local officials.  In con-
trast, the courts should be deferential to state and local officials
where those parties have met the procedural requirements of the
IDEA, in large part because these officials are in the best position
to evaluate the facts of the case, and also to evaluate any impact of
special educational costs on the school district.
Professor Colker argues that the mainstreaming requirement is
in many instances inappropriate, and that Congress should alter
the statutory language to relax the mainstreaming requirement and
also to allow for a subjective, case by case approach.215  Given the
heterogeneity in clinical outcome of the ASD diagnosis, a subjec-
tive approach is warranted, and the examination of case law in Part
II suggests that school districts make significant efforts to accom-
modate the subjective needs of each child.216  It is also likely that
Professor Colker’s argument in favor of amending the statutory
language to permit a case-by-case analysis is largely moot, because
each of the circuit tests discussed above applies a subjective stan-
dard, in large part based on the statutory language itself.217
Colker’s proposal, however, of shifting the importance of main-
streaming is especially relevant in the context of ASD, where the
clinical features of these disorders and the favored therapies tend
to make mainstreaming less appropriate.  Congress, via statutory
amendment, and the Department of Education, through regulatory
changes, should relax the mainstreaming requirement in the con-
text of children with autism.218  This would allow school districts to
develop IEPs for autistic children that are as effective as possible at
215. See Colker, supra note 194, at 855-58. R
216. See, e.g., Pachl v. Seagren, 453 F.3d. 1064 (8th Cir. 2006) (approving educa-
tional placement in a segregated classroom); see also Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 996 (ap-
proving of school district’s educational plan that involved placement in self-contained
classroom for child with autism); Centerville City Sch. Dist. v. Goldman, No. C-3-92-
442, 1993 WL 1318610 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 1993). Contra Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch.
Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1038 (8th Cir. 2000).
217. See, e.g., Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 574 F.2d 1026, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he language of the [IDEA] itself provides a workable test for determining
whether a state has complied with the [IDEA’s] mainstreaming requirement.”).
218. The differential treatment of children with ASD is not likely to raise valid
constitutional issues of equal protection.  As Prof. Colker points out, “[t]he Supreme
Court has not attached strict scrutiny to disability classifications. . . .  Because strict
scrutiny does not attach to disability, Congress arguably has more flexibility in think-
ing about remedial options in the disability context than in the race context.”  Colker,
supra note 194, at 807-08. R
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providing meaningful skill development.  Further, the effective
equivalence of the circuit tests for compliance with the main-
streaming requirement would increase Congressional certainty that
it could proceed without concerns about differential impact on dif-
ferent regions of the country.
CONCLUSION
Autism is a relatively common disorder that is costly to families
and society; facilitating treatment for autism is thus critical. Con-
gress has placed a burden on schools of providing special education
tailored to the needs of these children.  As indicated above, the
clinical features of autism and the therapies for autism are in ten-
sion with the mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA.  By re-
laxing the mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA, Congress and
the Department of Education would effectuate the laudable goal of
allowing schools to provide optimal treatment for children with au-
tism, while relying on the effective equivalence of the circuit tests
of mainstreaming to obviate concerns about differing regional im-
pacts of such legislative and regulatory change.
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